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Ukraine’s Warning: Drone Defense Must Keep Evolving

One of the challenges we Ukrainians have encountered in the ongoing war with Russia is that a defense can perform well against one kind of drone attack and be far less effective against another.

Equipment that can handle three drones in a particular region may struggle when 30 arrive together, especially if they approach at different altitudes or some are decoys. Soldiers learn to recognize certain patterns, while the enemy studies their response and finds ways to change them.

Russia has repeatedly changed the scale and composition of its attacks, combining attack drones, decoys, faster jet-powered drones and missiles in different proportions. Even with Ukraine’s combat experience, we are still adapting.

The useful lesson for the United States is to look beyond the threats we already know and prepare for those that have yet to appear. Ukrainian experience can help identify where the next problems may arise, although we do not have all the answers ourselves.

Drone autonomy defenses

Consider the growing autonomy of drones.

Electronic countermeasures can disrupt communication with an operator, but their usefulness declines when a drone can continue its mission independently. Physical interception then becomes more important, with its own limits when large numbers of targets arrive at once.

Against fast jet-powered attack drones, inexpensive interceptor missiles that can be produced in large quantities are among the most promising options. An interceptor should cost several times less than its target, preferably 10 times less. Otherwise, defending against mass attacks becomes difficult to sustain economically.

Combining approaches

There are different ways to combine these means of protection. A manufacturer may build an effective family of products designed to work together, but there is no requirement for one company to provide everything. Other manufacturers may develop better solutions for particular tasks. What matters to the military is whether the equipment can communicate through common protocols, so that a better drone detector or interceptor can be introduced without replacing other components that still work well.

Even when different products work well together, their effectiveness can change sharply if the enemy varies the number of targets, their routes or the proportion of decoys.

As the U.S. builds out its own drone defenses, the best approach for testing is to evaluate the entire drone defense under changing conditions rather than rely on the results of a single exercise. Specialists with recent combat experience, including those from Ukraine, could help make such testing more realistic and draw attention to threats that existing procedures may overlook.

Ukraine also has an unusual relationship between military users and civilian developers. Many defense companies grew out of volunteer efforts or were founded by people whose friends and relatives serve in the armed forces. As a result, these developers often have a deeper understanding of the military’s actual needs and the problems that new technologies could help solve.

The United States operates in different circumstances, so building a similarly strong understanding of military needs among civilian developers may require a more deliberate effort.

I have seen how useful that understanding can be. Sometimes engineers find a new application for existing technology, while military units identify limitations that only become apparent during combat. A small modification can produce a very different result in practice.

That is why the first delivery cannot be the end of a manufacturer’s involvement. Developers need to understand how their solutions perform in actual use and what changes could make them more effective.

Drone Dominance Program for drone defenses

The Pentagon’s Drone Dominance Program, a $1 billion effort to build low-cost, lethal drones, is a particularly useful example of giving manufacturers a chance to demonstrate their products and compete for military order The program concerns development of strike drones, but a similar approach could be useful for counter-drone technologies.

Ukraine has had hundreds of companies seeking to assist in the development of defense technology for the war effort, though only a few dozen became major suppliers. Competition helped the industry improve, but orders were just as important.

Manufacturers need them to establish production, secure components and gain experience from actual use. One lesson for the U.S. to consider in its push for drone defenses is to make initial orders more accessible to smaller American companies and increase the requirements as their products develop. This gives the military more options and keeps manufacturers working on improvements after the initial purchase.

The United States has more time to prepare for future threats than Ukraine had at the start of the full-scale invasion. It can use that time to learn from people facing those threats now, develop equipment that works with products from different manufacturers and keep improving it after delivery.

Perhaps the biggest lesson for the U.S. from Ukraine’s experience is that drone defenses will need to continuously evolve.

 

 

 

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