
U.S Indo-Pacific Forces Need a Digital Upgrade
The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command must modernize networks, data environments and coalition structures. It must also enhance cybersecurity strategies to achieve decision dominance by 2027 and beyond.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command must modernize networks, data environments and coalition structures. It must also enhance cybersecurity strategies to achieve decision dominance by 2027 and beyond.

The prospect of losing a large defense contractor seems particularly ill advised considering the administration’s national defense strategy that demands vast defense expertise and industrial capacity amid growing threats.

Europe must match its rules to its goals. If it wants shared capability, it must fund shared programs.

Cross-domain security technologies can provide a secure bridge to enable secure data exchange.

The Trump administration can’t meet its “Arsenal of Freedom” goals without the combined efforts of the full range of American expertise: new entrants, prime innovators and commercial crossovers.

The catastrophic export control failures of both the Netherlands and E.U. mean this challenge must now be addressed by other approaches available to NATO nations.

The challenge is ensuring commercial electronics can be scaled, surged and, most importantly, trusted as one element within a national strategy.

Addressing concerns about the V-22 Osprey is a necessity. But so is preserving a platform unlike any other in the U.S. inventory.

“Resilience” means designing ground systems that can survive a contested environment, adapt to changing commercial offerings and still deliver reliable communications.

Exquisite defense tech will always have a place in satellites and intercontinental missiles, but it cannot scale to the pace of modern conflict. What does scale is commercial technology.

U.S production for key UAV electronic components, airframes and propulsion systems remains fragmented, with limited capacity for rapid surge.

The reality is that the U.S. lacks a reliable method for sharing mission data across allied forces quickly and securely.

The military’s zero trust approach redefines security principles with a focus on drastically reducing attack surfaces.

Warfighters may be unknowingly revealing sensitive patterns of strategic thought through their interactions with commercial AI systems.

Seoul is planning to deploy four electronic warfare aircraft by 2034. Such a decision is a landmark that indicates a doctrinal shift.

The Navy currently is composed of approximately 290 ships centered around 11 nuclear aircraft carriers. The responsibilities outlined in the strategy suggest a larger Navy of approximately 350 manned ships and 12 flattops.

The U.S. Navy should pursue the concept of teaming manned units — like attack submarines — with unmanned units as the best method to maximize combat potential.

As the volume of data fed into artificial intelligence models increases and its velocity accelerates, the attack surface grows.

Restarting explosive nuclear weapons testing, or even for political reasons conducting tests that don’t generate a nuclear yield, is unnecessary and counterproductive.

Poisonings, cyber-attacks, sabotage of infrastructure – these have become so common it is increasingly hard to think that Russia is not at war with us.

America is pursuing a route that will shackle its biotech industry to the socialist policies of Europe, the UK and Canada. At the same time, our biggest geopolitical adversary is steadily ramping theirs up.

The aircraft carrier remains an incredibly flexible platform due to the infinite changes possible in its main battery air wing.

Modern air defense systems have become important instruments, shaping contemporary politics.

With the rapid closing of the “Davidson window,” the more the U.S. can do to stockpile oil for military use, the better.

The manufacturing boom won’t materialize without greater effort by private industry, government agencies, educational institutions and non-profits.

Defense electronics are the endgame, and scaling up mineral capacity without doing the same for electronics will lead to failure.

The goal is to fund efforts that make what is invisible visible, so that clinicians can guide treatments and rehabilitation.

We need to link delivery performance to mission impact, because there is no value in shipping software code weekly if it fails to advance mission metrics or creates a poor user experience.

Golden Dome isn’t just about intercepting enemy weapons. It’s also about modernizing the civilian systems that millions of Americans rely on every day to fly safely.

Engagement by the UK’s financial sector in security and defense has been tepid at best. This must change.