Iran may well lay mines in small numbers, but it is unlikely to produce expansive, carefully engineered minefields on the scale Iraq achieved in 1990.
If we can’t produce components needed for our most advanced weapon systems domestically, then we could find ourselves at the mercy of stalled global supply chains.
South Korea has a robust navy that could help in Hormuz. A closer look reveals that its core ships are intricately integrated with deterrence on the Korean peninsula.
This is not a debate about manned versus unmanned, nor about exquisite versus cheap. It is about operational effectiveness.
In the absence of direction and accountability, an “assume breach” mindset can help agencies and operators prepare for attacks and expedite the implementation of this guidance.
The volume, velocity and value of data have increased exponentially as defense organizations modernize, but so have the risks.
Getting these platforms into the hands of forces is critical, but fielding tools is only the start. Leaders must ensure people have the time, training and permission to learn them well.
Modernizing the deeply entrenched acquisition process is certainly a formidable task, but one that is essential.
Where we once the U.S. made 30 percent of the world supply of printed circuit boards, the U.S. now makes only 4 percent.
The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command must modernize networks, data environments and coalition structures. It must also enhance cybersecurity strategies to achieve decision dominance by 2027 and beyond.
The prospect of losing a large defense contractor seems particularly ill advised considering the administration’s national defense strategy that demands vast defense expertise and industrial capacity amid growing threats.
Europe must match its rules to its goals. If it wants shared capability, it must fund shared programs.
Cross-domain security technologies can provide a secure bridge to enable secure data exchange.
The Trump administration can’t meet its “Arsenal of Freedom” goals without the combined efforts of the full range of American expertise: new entrants, prime innovators and commercial crossovers.
The catastrophic export control failures of both the Netherlands and E.U. mean this challenge must now be addressed by other approaches available to NATO nations.
The challenge is ensuring commercial electronics can be scaled, surged and, most importantly, trusted as one element within a national strategy.
Addressing concerns about the V-22 Osprey is a necessity. But so is preserving a platform unlike any other in the U.S. inventory.
“Resilience” means designing ground systems that can survive a contested environment, adapt to changing commercial offerings and still deliver reliable communications.
Exquisite defense tech will always have a place in satellites and intercontinental missiles, but it cannot scale to the pace of modern conflict. What does scale is commercial technology.
U.S production for key UAV electronic components, airframes and propulsion systems remains fragmented, with limited capacity for rapid surge.
The reality is that the U.S. lacks a reliable method for sharing mission data across allied forces quickly and securely.
The military’s zero trust approach redefines security principles with a focus on drastically reducing attack surfaces.
Warfighters may be unknowingly revealing sensitive patterns of strategic thought through their interactions with commercial AI systems.
Seoul is planning to deploy four electronic warfare aircraft by 2034. Such a decision is a landmark that indicates a doctrinal shift.
The Navy currently is composed of approximately 290 ships centered around 11 nuclear aircraft carriers. The responsibilities outlined in the strategy suggest a larger Navy of approximately 350 manned ships and 12 flattops.
The U.S. Navy should pursue the concept of teaming manned units — like attack submarines — with unmanned units as the best method to maximize combat potential.
As the volume of data fed into artificial intelligence models increases and its velocity accelerates, the attack surface grows.
Restarting explosive nuclear weapons testing, or even for political reasons conducting tests that don’t generate a nuclear yield, is unnecessary and counterproductive.
Poisonings, cyber-attacks, sabotage of infrastructure – these have become so common it is increasingly hard to think that Russia is not at war with us.
America is pursuing a route that will shackle its biotech industry to the socialist policies of Europe, the UK and Canada. At the same time, our biggest geopolitical adversary is steadily ramping theirs up.
