When most people look at a piece of military hardware, say an F-35, they see a single unit – a jet fighter. But in reality, it is an almost unfathomably complex integration of thousands upon thousands of individual parts, each one crucial to the operation of the machine, the failure of any one of which could mean failure of the mission or the loss of an American servicemember.
The F-35’s engine alone is composed of more than 45,000 parts, each critical to the aircraft’s performance and many of which are manufactured overseas or contain raw materials that are mined in other countries, not all of whom have our best interests at heart.
It’s easy to see how this is a problem, especially as our military, along with those of our allies, are operating F-35s in the most critical conflict zones like the Persian Gulf – and it’s not limited to the F-35.
If we cannot produce the components needed for our most advanced weapon systems domestically, then we could find ourselves at the mercy of stalled global supply chains. Any number of complications at any time could interrupt the supply of materials from overseas, including geopolitical factors.
It is not only conceivable but likely that a hostile actor like China or Russia could intentionally obstruct those supply chains, effectively choking off our ability to produce and field weapons and material when we most need them.
A dangerous vulnerability
Consider the current situation in the Persian Gulf. We are successfully defeating Iranian missiles, drones and other threats, as are our allies using American-supplied air defense systems. But in doing so, we are using a lot of our own munitions. What happens if we need to rapidly produce more to meet evolving threats, but critical parts for them need to be sourced from counties that are subject to Chinese economic coercion, or even blockade?
We should never let ourselves become that vulnerable, and yet in many respects we have.
Several of the critical minerals necessary for the production of highly specialized components, for example, are mined and processed overseas in places like China.
An uncomfortable number of specialty items – such as high-tech magnets containing neodymium, which make up key components of missile guidance systems, aircraft, satellites, radar and sonar – are also increasingly manufactured offshore, making them highly susceptible to supply chain disruptions.
The problem is compounded as we look to upgrade our arsenals and maintain our technological edge. For instance, development of the next generation adaptive propulsion (NGAP) system, which will be crucial to maintaining air superiority in a near-peer environment, could be at risk of costly delay – or even termination – if it is too dependent on foreign sources of specialized components.
A national priority
The good news is that the Trump administration has recognized the problem and made it a national priority to rectify it. On Feb. 4, the U.S. State Department hosted the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial where the U.S. signed several memoranda of understanding and bilateral critical mineral trade frameworks.
They include steps towards establishing a critical minerals trade bloc among friendly nations to help secure sources for these vital elements. And last summer, President Trump and European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyden signed a trade agreement that included a zero-for-zero tariff policy on aerospace parts.
These actions, alongside President Trump’s efforts to reinvigorate domestic manufacturing and increase defense spending, are key steps towards securing our military supply chains and making us less dependent on adversarial nations like China for our defense needs.
But more needs to be done, and it is incumbent on Congress to follow the president’s lead to repatriate our defense industry.
Reducing the bureaucratic red tape and regulatory burden imposed on our defense industry would be a good place to start. The Federal Acquisition Regulations alone encompass more than 2,300 pages. Establishing incentives for domestic defense-related manufacturing are equally important.
A defense-oriented version of the CHIPS Act, a proposed $30 billion investment in bring semiconductor manufacturing back to American shores, would be a powerful step
America’s military is the best, most skilled and most technologically advanced in the world, as we see proven every day in the skies and seas of the Persian Gulf. To ensure that continues, we need to make investments to secure the supply of critical materials and repatriate as much of our defense manufacturing as we can.
Reducing U.S. vulnerability to global supply disruptions is not only good economics – it’s a strategic and national security necessity.
