Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, the late naval tactics expert, preached the gospel of distributed operations with unified impact over the course of his entire teaching and writing career. Even the last edition of his Fleet Tactics book series published shortly before his death continued to call for larger numbers of smaller ships armed primarily with missiles.
This force design change was to ensure better distribution so the Navy could both attack effectively first and absorb attacks without major losses in combat capacity. The Navy, however, has been historically averse to larger numbers of smaller ships, citing everything from their relatively low survivability to the additional costs needed to forward base and operate them.
But the potential introduction of smaller, unmanned ships as an adjunct to the existing surface force, and as a developing stand-alone capability, in many ways solves Hughes’ dilemma with an existing fleet of large ships not able to distribute combat capability.
The quest for a force of smaller ships
Over the course of three books and numerous articles, Capt. Hughes repeatedly called for what he dubbed a “bimodal fleet” that contained both large and small combatants. Larger vessels that concentrated too much combat capability in too few units, in Hughes’ opinion, could be overwhelmed by enemy missiles.
One U.S. AEGIS warship might be immensely powerful, with 96 vertical launch missile cells, and sensors that could sweep thousands of square miles of space, but it was also fragile because one missile hit might disable its entire magazine of weapons.
Hughes’ solution was a larger fleet of many smaller, single-mission ships, most of which would be missile carriers. Such a fleet could suffer heavy casualties, but since no one ship would hold more than eight to 16 missiles, only the destruction of the entire force of small combatants would eliminate the capability that brought to the fight.
Mathematical analysis suggested that given the ability of smarter missiles to penetrate even layered ship defenses, especially in littoral areas, that it was inevitable at least one missile would evade countermeasures, effectively winning the battle for the force with many more distributed warships.
Navy doesn’t like small ships
In contrast to Hughes’ views, the U.S. Navy has seldom been a fan of smaller warships. While John Paul Jones first made his mark as the commander of a small warship, and destroyers have always been the epitome of independent command, the Navy generally does not like anything smaller than a frigate.
Previous versions of the small, capital ship-killer like the motor torpedo boat, and Cold War-era missile patrol boat never lived up to the potential to which their proponents endowed them.
World War I small craft sank battleships, but their World War II successors did not, and the vaunted U.S. PT boat never sank anything larger than a Japanese destroyer. Cruise and ballistic missiles have indeed become ship killers, but small craft have sunk but a handful of ships. When put to the test, the small missile combatant that features prominently in Hughes’ writing has never been tested successfully in the manner he intended, either by the U.S. or other navies.
The Navy has complained that logistics issues limit a fleet of smaller, manned missile craft. While more distributed, and hence more survivable, than one destroyer, it takes many missile craft at sea to equal the firepower of 90-plus vertical launch missile cells..
Assuming that each missile craft would carry eight cruise missiles, that means 12 such small warships would have to be at sea to equal the firepower of one destroyer. Those smaller warships often have less range than larger warships, so they would need to be based closer to the potential fight, their crews housed and protected, or at least supported by a tender that in turn would need protection of its own in the form of other warships.
It becomes readily apparent why the Navy would choose one destroyer over all those smaller craft in terms of economies of scale, especially in a peacetime environment.
Unmanned small combatant is the answer
The unmanned (medium) surface vessel may be the answer to what both Capt. Hughes and the Navy desire. He saw the unmanned ship as an excellent, attritable scout. But an unmanned surface vessel, armed with eight to 16 missiles and grouped with similar ships, becomes the small combatant missile force desired by Hughes as a distributed and more survivable force compared to a single destroyer, whose entire magazine can be put out of action by one missile hit.
For the regular Navy, the medium unmanned surface vessel is no longer a competitor against the destroyer force, but rather a partner. Deploying the unmanned force together with the larger, manned warships gains the most advantage from each type of platform. A destroyer controlling four unmanned warships with eight missiles each provides that manned warship with one-third additional, distributed missile firepower. The manned surface fleet is then more distributed and less vulnerable to missile salvo attack then would be a single vessel.
The unmanned force will still require tender or shore base support, but removing the crew element on those smaller ships obviates the need for more extensive support including food, fresh water, barracks ashore for the crews of small warships and the status of forces agreements necessary to permanently base more U.S. service people in a foreign country.
Not all costs can be eliminated, and some initial costs to develop unmanned capacity will likely be more expensive. The long-term benefits, however, in gaining a more distributive surface force without having to replace the existing manned fleet greatly outweigh those initial costs.
Rather than compete with the traditional, larger warships as some perceived Hughes’ ideas did, the unmanned missile ships would complement the surface combatant fleet by making it more lethal, more distributive and more survivable than manned ships alone.
It’s time to cement Capt. Hughes’ legacy by making unmanned ships the new bi-modal fleet option for the surface fleet.
