The U.S. doesn’t have an innovation problem in terms of microelectronics, or a talent problem or even an investment problem.
What the U.S. has is a coordination problem, and that’s threatening the livelihood of our domestic microelectronics ecosystem.
From semiconductors to substrates and packaged, tested and qualified components, the U.S. has allowed domestic capabilities to be overlooked or underused, while China presses forward with ruthless efficiency and national-level focus.
The problem isn’t just about microelectronics that have shifted offshore over the last several decades. Rather, it’s about failure to act, even as the path forward is staring at us in the face. We know where the vulnerabilities are, and we know who the assured suppliers are.
But instead of empowering and cultivating the ecosystem we already have, we’re still clinging to the status quo:
- Defense supply chains are based on cost, not security.
- The performers and fabricators leverage and profit from overseas sources that are subsidized by our adversaries.
- Our taxpayer- and industry-funded domestic infrastructure is waiting on and cannot succeed without demand.
The result is a dangerously fragile domestic ecosystem that should be relied on for the systems that power our military, economy and critical infrastructure.
The Ford-class aircraft carrier reportedly relies on over 6,500 semiconductor components from China. Drones and autonomous systems still depend on advanced substrates we can’t scale domestically. Even key sensors, radio frequency modules and connectors come from offshore vendors, including from adversarial nations.
The U.S. needs to be doing much more right now, not after China invades Taiwan.
Here’s what needs to change:
1. Use the data we already have.
We must provide the blueprints for our military electronics to a neutral stakeholder vetted by industry and U.S. government to aggregate bills of materials and prioritize at-risk commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) electronic components that come from Chinese sources.
An industry and subject matter expert task force can group the components into technology families, such as analog-to-digital converters and processors. The task force can then identify pathways for domestic and allied alternatives — from semiconductor foundries to packaged and qualified components. The goal is to fast-track replacement with more assured commercial sources.
2. Fund demonstrators that prove domestic capability.
We have assured sources that can meet the need if we can validate and elevate them. Demonstrating COTS prototype alternatives designed and fabricated by domestic suppliers is essential to proving hardware can meet mission requirements and de-risk system adoption.
3. Build the full chain.
The Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors Act (CHIPS) is a great start, but the supply chain doesn’t end with the chip. It continues through packaging, printed circuit board substrates, interconnects, test, qualification and assembly. Many of these capabilities already exist within more assured domestic and allied providers, but they’re operating in silos without enough work to offset overhead expenses or support new technology development.
4. Make domestic sourcing commercially viable and expand economy of scale.
Defense demand isn’t enough. We must help U.S. suppliers scale into commercial markets, leveraging critical infrastructure to grow long-term demand pipelines and capacity to scale.
5. Hold industry accountable.
Defense prime integrators or the subcontractors in their supply chain know the bills of materials. They have the buying power to make different choices, and the U.S. Government must demand they do. Transparency combined with buyer directives, assurance standards and contract incentives can shift this dynamic.
The U.S. is not short on solutions. It is short on urgency and action. The real risk isn’t that we don’t know what to do. It’s that we’re choosing not to do it.
