Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro announced on Oct. 31 the formation of a new maritime Strategic Studies Group (SSG) modeled on the 1980’s Chief of Naval Operations group. Its mission is to “train future flag officers in strategic thinking and to conduct research on some of the Department of the Navy’s most vexing strategic challenges.”
The election of former President Donald J. Trump to a second term would likely obviate this effort, as John Phelan, Trump’s incoming Navy secretary, would have his own ideas and potential organizational changes for the naval services.
But the next Navy secretary should keep the core of Del Toro’s idea and create a group of upwardly mobile Navy, Coast Guard and Merchant Marine captains and Marine Corps colonels to examine, assess, create and experiment with new concepts of Naval strategy and operations. The increasing tensions with China demand it.
A Navy secretariat-led SSG could also forge the connections with political leaders needed by the Navy to revive the interest and expertise of civilian government leaders in maritime strategy and policy. Finally, exposing flag-eligible Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and Merchant Marine officers to senior policy makers and their challenges supports the development of wartime leaders that better understand and work with the nation’s civilian leadership.
The original Strategic Studies Group (SSG)was created in 1981 by Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Thomas Hayward. It was designed to take advantage of the facilities and instructors of the Naval War College and support a group of upwardly mobile Navy captains and Marine Corps colonels as they sought to implement the Navy’s new maritime strategy concept and to connect these solutions to Navy programming efforts for future systems.
The demise of the Navy’s war laboratory
The CNO SSG continued as a war laboratory through the end of the Cold War and into the early 1990’s. In 1994 then-CNO Adm. Mike Boorda decided that since the Cold War had ended and there was no peer opponent on the immediate horizon that the SSG would now focus on new aspects of naval warfare.
From 1994 through 2016 the group continued to examine new concepts as diverse as technological and personnel management solutions. It grew, took on more junior and civilian members and added the Coast Guard to its ranks. It had to compete however with a growing number of similar organizations in the 2000’s starting with the CNO’s “Deep Blue” initiative that also examines innovative technologies, as well as larger, crowd-sourced groups like the Surface Warfare Athena project.
Deep Blue was dissolved in 2008, but SSG soldiered on into the 2nd decade of the 21st century. In 2016 CNO Adm. John Richardson decided to close down the SSG, with at least one source suggesting that the effort was inefficient. “To have 18 captains up in Newport working on one problem wasn’t as valuable as having that same manpower working on various problems in real time.”
While many, including this author, decried the decision at that time, the SSG of 2016 was no longer looking at operational application of maritime strategy. The U.S. Navy had largely abandoned any peer competition strategy with the Cold War’s end in 1990 and had instead relied on a series of white paper policy documents to articulate its “strategy” for global operations and fleet size and force design,
More “warrior admirals” needed
Then-Navy Secretary John Lehman hailed the SSG effort as a method to develop what he called, “a new generation of warrior admirals.” His example should guide the incoming Navy secretary, especially considering the possibility of conflict on the horizon.
A new SSG might involve advanced instruction in maritime strategy and policy beyond what is offered at the Naval War College and Marine Corps University, a deep dive into the current threat intelligence provided by the Naval War College Halsey Alfa and Bravo and Holloway groups, wargaming and a work project to present both the secretary and the CNO with actionable solutions to the key operational problems facing the sea services.
The new secretary ought to find a way to keep that program active as a way of connecting the secretariat, the secretary of defense and the president to the leadership of the fleet.
It’s no secret in Washington that the Navy secretariat and CNO staffs do not often communicate well with each other, and such a group might better facilitate that exchange. If war comes, it will be essential for the SECNAV and CNO staffs to work in close concert to deploy as much of the nation’s maritime capability as possible to forward joint commanders.
When Secretary Lehman met with the SSG in 1981 he told them that, “Ships and weapons are only tools. The question is, ‘how do you fight with what you are going to get?’” This is certainly the primary mission of a new SSG.
The specter of war in the Indo-Pacific today calls for the immediate return of a strategic studies group of future flag and general officers to focus on the challenges of such a conflict. Just as in the 1970’s, the Navy has spent the last decade removing itself from supporting land wars in Asia and has refocused itself on sea control against a peer opponent. The SSG is again needed to address the challenges associated with war against a peer adversary. Bring it back now.
