The sophisticated attack on Hezbollah this week in which Israel is suspected of detonating pagers carried by Hezbollah members could bring a serious escalation in the attrition war between the two sides that started following the Hamas terror strike on Oct. 7, 2023.
Israel is fighting a war on several fronts, mainly against Hamas in Gaza but also Hezbollah in Lebanon, to reestablish the deterrence that failed it last year. The terrorist organization has fired rockets, missiles and attack drones into Israel since the Hamas rampage, resulting in some 60,000 Israelis currently evacuated from their homes in the northern part of the country.
What is occurring now between Israel and Hezbollah, and by extension its patron Iran, is a type of attrition war, in which both sides are trying to wear down the other, though without the commitment of large numbers of forces.
Several reasons to avoid a major war
One of the options Israel is weighing is ending the fight by conducting a large-scale war in Lebanon. But this would be a huge gamble and a grave mistake, for several reasons.
First, Hezbollah is the strongest non-state actor in the Middle East. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) is much more powerful than Hezbollah — Hezbollah does not have an air force, armor corps, heavy artillery or navy. However, Hezbollah has up to 200,000 missiles, rockets and drones that can cover all of Israel.
The ongoing attrition war degraded some of Hezbollah’s arsenal, yet in a major war Hezbollah still can fire massive barrages that might elude Israeli air defenses like the Iron Dome and cause heavy casualties and damage. Hezbollah would pay a bigger price, but Hezbollah could recover, as the group did after the last war with Israel in 2006.
Second, Hezbollah functions as an improvised state within a nearly failed state. The central government in Beirut can’t or won’t control Hezbollah, which is part of that government. The country could well crumble into even greater failure and outright civil war should a large-scale war erupt.
And Israel has warned that if it had to resort to a major operation, it would strike very hard. Senior Israeli officials, civilian and military, have warned in recent years that they would hit a range of targets in an all-out war, including infrastructure, if needed.
U.S., Israeli interests diverge
This is where U.S. and Israeli interests diverge. The U.S. does not want Lebanon to collapse. Furthermore, Iran, chief sponsor of Hezbollah, might intervene if it assumes Hezbollah is losing, leading to a regional war. Iran might also strike at Gulf Arab states that are U.S. partners, another concern for the United States.
Israel must take into consideration American interests since it relies heavily on the U.S. for military aid and highly valuable political support, certainly during a war in Lebanon. Those significant constraints would pressure Israel to avoid a major war in Lebanon.
Third, should the IDF attack Hezbollah in a major war, it would not enjoy the element of surprise. Hezbollah is on high alert, deployed in areas in Lebanon that are prepared for combat, above and underground. The IDF also requires time to let its troops recover after their tough fight in the Gaza Strip, before confronting Hezbollah.
The IDF also must organize additional units, get enough ammunition and spare parts and weapons and gather more intelligence about Hezbollah. Since the Lebanon-based force is much stronger than Hamas, Israel must invest enough time and resources to be ready or else it might increase both the cost it will pay and chances of failure. Either way, even in the best conditions, a war with Hezbollah would be risky and costly for Israel.
Two bad options
Lastly, an Israeli offensive can push Hezbollah combatants out of south Lebanon, but then Israel would face two very problematic options. After a major Israeli attack, withdrawal would allow Hezbollah to regain its presence near the border with Israel. But remaining in Lebanon to occupy a security zone that prevents Hezbollah from launching rockets into Israel could result in a price higher than in Israel’s previous deployment there in the 1990s, a grim memory for many in the country.
Israel must weigh the serious implications of the war Hamas started, such as its huge financial cost, which harms her economy, a cost that would be much higher if there is a major war with Hezbollah.
Considering strategic, military, economic and political factors in play, Israel has to go back to the policy it had before Oct. 7, 2023, to deter and contain Hezbollah as much as possible. It is a risky policy, as the stunning spy craft of the exploding pagers demonstrates. But it held for 17 years, which is a lengthy period of relative quiet anywhere, especially in the Middle East.
